WikiRevolution? by Der Derian, James
Has WikiLeaks changed the world?1 Th e tweets, blogs and 
instant messaging of the digerati say yes, and much for 
the better. Th e offi  cial press releases of the new precariat – 
the U.S. Departments of Defense (‘WikiLeaks….puts at 
risk the lives of our troops’) and Justice (‘…puts the safety 
of Americans at risk’) – also say yes, but much for the 
worse. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton upped the ante 
and universalized the threat, declaring WikiLeaks ‘an at-
tack on the world’. Th e seen-it-all-before printerati said 
hold on a nano-second, this is nothing new. Nevertheless, 
they did their best to keep the story alive as long as their 
superannuated technology could be sustained by it. 
Th e battle lines of WikiLeaks zigged and zagged at 
net-speed across a multitude of platforms. Th e rising hot 
air of righteous whistle blowing and the downdraft of 
offi  cial recriminations formed a perfect media super-
cell. WikiLeaks might or might not have changed the 
world, but it certainly resurrected the Marshall McLuhan 
’brand’: the medium still is the message.
WikiLeaks also re-opened the post-9/11 hunting sea-
son on the messengers. Julian Assange, self-proclaimed 
editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks, was given an ankle bracelet 
and confi ned to a Norfolk estate, pending the outcome 
of a UK Supreme Court decision on an extradition re-
quest by the Swedish authorities to answer questions on 
outstanding sexual misconduct allegations. On the legal 
horizon, Assange faced possible extradition to the United 
States, where he is under investigation by a grand jury 
sitting in Northern Virginia, a venue known for reaching 
outcomes preferred by national security denizens.2 
Meanwhile, Private Bradley Manning, the Army in-
telligence analyst based outside Baghdad who allegedly 
downloaded documents from the Secret Internet Protocol 
Router Network (SIPRNet), smuggled them out by re-
writing a Lady Gaga CD, and began passing them on to 
WikiLeaks in late 2009, was arrested on May 26, 2010. 
He was charged under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice for ‘transferring classifi ed data onto his personal 
computer and adding unauthorized software to a classi-
fi ed computer system in connection with the leaking of 
a video of a helicopter attack in Iraq in 2007’ – which 
became known as the ‘Collateral Murder’ video – and 
‘communicating, transmitting and delivering national 
defense information to an unauthorized source and dis-
closing classifi ed information concerning the national de-
fense with reason to believe that the information could 
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‘It might actually change something.’
Pfc. Bradley Manning, Instant Messaging
 
Chris Anderson: Wow, so your leak really substantially changed the world?
Julian Assange: Yep.
TEDTalks 
The fi rst serious infowar is now engaged. The fi eld of battle is WikiLeaks.
John Perry Barlow, Twitter
My consistent answer to the ponderous question of how WikiLeaks transformed our world has been: 
really, not all that much. It was a hell of a story and a wild collaboration, but it did not herald, as the 
documentarians yearn to believe, some new digital age of transparency.
‘WikiLeaks, a Postscript’, Bill Keller, New York Times 
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cause injury to the United States. As the investigation 
continued, 22 additional charges were laid, including 
leaking over a half million documents and two videos 
as well as posting wrongfully obtained classifi ed material 
on the Internet with the knowledge that it would aid the 
enemy, a serious crime that comes with a death penalty 
(the prosecutors have said that they will only seek life 
imprisonment).3 Manning spent the next nine months in 
solitary confi nement at the Quantico Marine Corps Base 
in Virginia, before being moved to a military correctional 
facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he awaits a 
general-court martial. 
Early accounts of WikiLeaks were highly polarized, 
with a tendency toward the sensational and personal. Was 
Manning an Army malcontent, a victim of gender iden-
tity disorder, an idealistic whistleblower – or perhaps all 
three? Was Assange a journalist with integrity or a cyber-
pastiche of James Bond? Suggestions of psychological and 
sexual deviance, mixed with stories of bad hygiene and 
mixed-color socks, produced an unsympathetic portrait 
of a narcissist seeking some kind of political validation. 
But even the parodies of Assange that began to proliferate 
on late-night TV and on the web suggested a begrudging 
respect for his willingness to stand up and be….paro-
died?4
Info-deterrence against whistleblowers went into hy-
per-drive. Anyone associated with WikiLeaks, remotely 
or directly, now or in the future, was well advised to 
run for the hills of northern Cyberistan. Former Vice 
Presidential candidate Sarah Palin got considerable press 
when she declared those responsible ‘should be hunted 
down like al-Qaeda’. Th e McCain’s engaged in a family 
competition to take Assange down and out. Senator John 
McCain declared Assange a national security threat and 
called for his prosecution under the Espionage Act of 
1917, which makes treasonable any eff ort to subvert the 
operations or promote insubordination of the U.S. mili-
tary during wartime.5 Meanwhile, McCain’s daughter, 
Meghan, a Daily Beast columnist, labeled Assange ‘un-
American’, echoing the language and logic of the follow-
up to the Espionage Act, Sedition Act of 1918 (repealed in 
1921), which prohibited ‘any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, 
or abusive language about the form of government of the 
United States ... or the fl ag of the United States, or the 
uniform of the Army or Navy.’6 When informed Assange 
was not an American, Meaghan McCain called him a 
‘creepy rogue Swedish guy’ (for the record, Assange is 
Australian). Robert McCain, founder of ‘Th e Other Mc-
Cain’ (no relation) blog, then coined the tag that went 
viral in conservative circles: ‘As for Julian Assange: Preda-
tor drone. Hellfi re Missile.’ 
As attempts at explanation became tarred as exonera-
tion, one of the lingering eff ects of 9/11, little room was 
left for the kind of detached analysis or historical com-
parison that might produce a credible answer to a much 
more important question: Has WikiLeaks changed the 
world? Or at the very least, infl uenced the practices of 
war and diplomacy? 
Revolution – or a disturbance in the Matrix?
Obviously, the ‘world’ took notice and took action when 
WikiLeaks began to release confi dential, classifi ed and 
secret documents and videos, fi rst in a trickle and then in 
a cascade. So yes, the world has been changed by WikiLe-
aks, to the extent the world has become a simulacral eff ect 
of the Internet. One does not have to accept Neo as ‘Th e 
One’ to believe this qualifi ed assertion. One needs only 
to witness the (over)reactions of the military, diplomatic 
and political elites of the world, in which the particular 
interests of the United States are generalized as the worlds 
through a position of preponderance in global media. 
Th is is the new game, not of nations but of networks, in 
which a chronopolitical balance of cyber-power is rapidly 
displacing older geopolitical institutions of international 
relations.
Grand claims require granular evidence. To be sure, 
the fi rst WikiLeaks, although numerous and regular, 
were hardly world-changers. Th ey included the Novem-
ber 2007 post of the U.S. Army’s S(tandard) O(perating) 
P(rocedures) at Camp Delta, the Guantanamo Bay deten-
tion camp; the March 2008 posts of 35 videos censored 
by the Chinese of civil unrest in Tibet and the secret 
protocols of the Church of Scientology; the September 
2008 post of Sarah Palin’s private Yahoo email account 
(yes, she had good cause to go after Assange); the No-
vember 2008 posts of extrajudicial killings by Kenyan 
police of human rights activists and the secret member-
ship list of the extreme-right British National Party; and 
the March 2009 posts of documents revealing Barclay 
Bank’s tax avoidance schemes and the alleged eff ort by 
the Australian and Danish governments to ban websites 
that resulted in the censoring of websites unrelated to 
their original targets of terrorism and child pornography; 
the July 2009 post of a nuclear accident happening at the 
Iranian Natanz nuclear facility (which corresponded to 
later media reports of the Stuxnet cyber-attack on the 
facility’s centrifuges); and the November 2009 post of 
570,000 intercepted pager messages on the day of the 
9/11 attack.7
Th is is when WikiLeaks went down the rabbit hole. 
In October 2009 it posted the British Ministry of De-
fense’s secret Joint Service Protocol 440, on how to pre-
vent information leaks by hackers, journalists and spies. 
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In March 2010 it followed up with a post on the U.S. 
Department of Defense Counterintelligence Analysis 
Report on the methods – and how to avoid them – of 
whistleblowers like WikiLeaks. Th e dragon had been 
poked.
 Th en came the ‘Collateral Murder’ video. Re-
leased on 5 April 2010, it showed a series of Baghdad as-
saults in July 2007 from the perspective of a U.S. helicop-
ter gun camera. Th e classifi ed footage showed in graphic 
detail the killing of at least twelve people, including two 
correspondents from Reuters. Two versions were released, 
one an unedited 39 –minute version, the other an ed-
ited an 18-minute version which had been edited and 
annotated. Th e latter did not clearly show that some of 
the victims had been carrying weapons. It didn’t matter: 
in the week that followed ‘WikLeaks’ became the most 
searched term on Google.
After that came ‘CableGate’, in which a small per-
centage (roughly ten percent) of 251,287 U.S. embassy 
cables passed to WikiLeaks were redacted and published 
by the El Pais, Le Monde, New York Times, Th e Guard-
ian, and Der Spiegel. Th e material was billed as explo-
sive. U.S. diplomats were spying on their counterparts 
(shock!). Arab states supported a fi rst strike on Iran (hor-
ror!). Th e Chinese government was engaged in computer 
hacking (no!). 
In response the U.S. Library of Congress and Depart-
ment of Education blocked access to WikiLeaks on their 
computers and the Departments of State and Commerce 
forbade government employees from visiting WikiLeaks 
website. As the cyber-game escalated, Assange gave a 
wink and a nod to the possibility of the release of more 
government cables – hold onto your aluminum-foil hats 
– on UFOs. By year’s end, ‘WikiLeaks’ climbed back up 
to the most searched term on Google. 
Revolution – or history by other means?
But in the hall of mirrors that makes up the simulacra of 
global politics, another possibility emerges. From the fi rst 
document posted by WikiLeaks in December 2006, on 
an alleged plot by Somali Islamic militants to assassinate 
Somalia government offi  cials, to the December 2011 ‘Spy 
Files’ listing 160 intelligence contractors purportedly in-
volved in mass surveillance, the glare of media attention 
created what could be called a penumbra eff ect, in which 
the original secret was overshadowed by the spectacle of 
the leak, eff ectively neutralizing the political impact of 
the revelation.
In such media-leptic moments, it is easy to join the 
chorus condemning the illegality of the leak while link-
ing the act to the low moral character of Assange, who 
has done his best not to disappoint the keepers of state 
secrets as well as public virtue. What gets lost in the white 
noise is a key question: has a leak ever changed the world? 
Some press accounts did cite the Pentagon Papers, leaked 
by Daniel Ellsberg (who has become a fi erce defender 
of Assange). But the diff erences, in character (a secret 
study of the Vietnam War that contradicted the offi  cial 
views of the Pentagon, quantity, and medium, exceed the 
similarities.
One needs to go deeper and further back to fi nd a 
comparable moment, one with a much more interesting 
outcome, when a revolution produced a historic leak that 
in turn changed history: November 8, 1917, the day after 
the Bolsheviks seized power and issued the ‘Decree on 
Peace’.
Th e Decree called for an armistice and for all parties 
‘to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic 
peace’ to end the First World War. Th e goals were radi-
cal: ‘by such a peace the government means an immedi-
ate peace without annexations (i.e., without the seizure 
of foreign lands, without the forcible incorporation of 
foreign nations) and without indemnities’. But it was the 
means to achieve them that took on a revolutionary char-
acter: ‘the government abolishes secret diplomacy, and, 
for its part, announces its fi rm intention to conduct all 
negotiations quite openly in full view of the whole peo-
ple.’ As a fi rst step, the government would ‘proceed im-
mediately with the full publication of the secret treaties.’ 
All means of communication would be deployed: 
Proposing to the governments and peoples of all 
countries immediately to begin open negotiations 
for peace, the government, for its part, expresses 
its readiness to conduct these negotiations in 
writing, by telegraph, and by negotiations 
between representatives of the various countries, 
or at a conference of such representatives.8
Th ere was a coda, usually excluded from the offi  cial ver-
sion, which comes from a fi nal ironic remark made by 
Lenin during his presentation of the Decree to the Second 
All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ 
Deputies: ‘We must remember that we are not living 
in the depths of Africa, but in Europe, where news can 
spread quickly.’9
A few days later Leon Trotsky took up the position of 
the fi rst People’s Commissar for Foreign Aff airs, declar-
ing he would ‘issue a few revolutionary proclamations to 
the peoples of the world and then shut up shop.’ Mak-
ing good on the Decree, his fi rst act was to open the 
safes of the Ministry and to publish the secret arrange-
ments made between the Tsarist regime and the British, 
French and other allied governments for the annexation 
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of lands and sharing the spoils of the First World War. 
Among them was the 1915 Treaty of London between 
Italy and Triple Entente (England, France and Russia) for 
Italy’s departure from the Triple Alliance (Germany and 
Austria-Hungary) in exchange for territorial annexations 
after the war, including the Austrian littoral and parts 
of the German Asian and African colonial territories. 
Trotsky released copies of Russia’s negotiations with the 
British, French, and Italians that lead to the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement of 1916, which eff ectively parceled out the 
remnants of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of infl u-
ence for the signatory powers. Addressing the All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets on November 22, 1917, Trotsky jus-
tifi ed the release of secret documents as not only in the 
interest of Russia but of the world: 
In publishing the secret diplomatic documents 
from the foreign policy archives of Tsarism and of 
the bourgeois coalition Governments of the fi rst 
seven months of the revolution, we are carrying 
out the undertaking which we made when our 
party was in opposition. Secret diplomacy is a 
necessary tool for a propertied minority which is 
compelled to deceive the majority in order to 
subject it to its interests…The Russian people, 
and the peoples of Europe and the whole world, 
should learn the documentary truth about the 
plans forged in secret by the fi nanciers and 
industrialists together with their parliamentary and 
diplomatic agents. The peoples of Europe have 
paid for the right to this truth with countless 
sacrifi ces and universal economic desolation. The 
abolition of secret diplomacy is the primary 
condition for an honest, popular, truly democratic 
foreign policy.10
Th ere was little immediate public reaction when the 
diplomatic correspondence and telegrams from the se-
cret agreements were released and appeared in Izvestiya 
on November 23, 1917. But with their translation and 
publication in the Manchester Guardian in Britain on 
December 12, 1917, suppressed revolutionary parties in 
Germany, Britain and throughout Europe seized on the 
diplomatic chicanery to reinvigorate the antiwar move-
ment. Th e world began to take note.
More leaks followed. Rarely noted in historical ac-
counts is the making public of diplomatic and other for-
eign communications intercepted and deciphered by the 
infamous ‘Black Cabinet’ of the Okhrana, the espionage 
and security wing of the Tsarist Regime. Among the 
documents released and published by the French Com-
munist newspaper L’Humanité were disclosures that the 
Tsarist regime had been subsidizing French journalists 
and politicians.11 Reformist parties in Western govern-
ments used the opportunity to challenge the aristocratic 
monopolization of diplomacy, which had abetted the rise 
of militarism in the lead-up and prosecution of the war. 
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who in a joint address 
to the US Congress on January 18, 1918, presented his’ 
Fourteen Points’, beginning with a page taken from the 
Bolshevik playbook, most prominently took up the re-
formist cause:
Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after 
which there shall be no private international 
understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall 
proceed always frankly and in the public view.12
Noble consanguinity, thinned on the battlefi elds and 
tainted by archival revelations, faced new popular chal-
lenges in the capitols of the defeated as well as victors. 
‘Old Diplomacy’, associated with the secret addenda, 
complex machinations, and balkanized politics that cas-
caded into the First World War, was no match for the 
principles of transparency, self-determination, and de-
mocracy espoused by the so-called ‘New Diplomacy’.13
Or so it seemed. As Richard Holbrook points out in 
his foreword to Margaret MacMillan’s defi nitive work, 
Paris 1919, the ‘headline version of history’ paints a lin-
ear path from the failure of diplomacy to implement a 
just peace at Versailles to the German invasion of Poland 
barely twenty years later.14 Indeed, many contemporary 
crises can be traced back to the decisions made in the Hall 
of Mirrors, including the Balkan wars of the 1990s, two 
wars in Iraq, unresolved confl icts in the Caucasus, and 
the ongoing dispute between Arabs and Jews in the Mid-
dle East.
Revolution – or society of the spectacle? 
As history phase-shifts with the information revolution, 
it is either too early or too late to say whether WikiLeaks 
has changed the world. Where once the truth was fi xed 
by the nation-state, it now dances under global media 
spotlight. Long before the Internet was invented by Al 
Gore, Guy Debord, one of the most perceptive critics of 
what he called the ‘society of the spectacle’, identifi ed the 
neutralizing eff ect of the media’s ubiquitous gaze:
‘The society signs a sort of peace treaty with its 
most outspoken enemies by giving them a spot in 
its spectacle.’15
Th is massaging of the medium hit home on a recent 
fl ight to Sydney, Australia. My seat companion was Jef-
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frey Bleich, the Obama-appointee to be the US Ambas-
sador to Australia. In the course of the 16-hour fl ight, we 
clashed on a single issue: WikiLeaks. With Assange still a 
popular fi gure in Australia – and rumored to be consider-
ing a run for public offi  ce (which just happened to come 
with criminal immunities) – Bleich had been spending an 
inordinate amount of time doing WikiLeak damage con-
trol.16 Somewhere over the imaginary land mass where 
Lost’s Oceanic Airlines Flight 815 disappeared, we agreed 
to disagree on the topic, in that diplomatic fashion that 
keeps troops in the barracks, missiles in their silos, and 
perpetual peace a viable aspiration rather than a tomb-
stone inscription.
As it turned out, the medium that massaged our dif-
ferences into a mutual respect was humor. Upon land-
ing, he was met by two very fi t Australians in suits that 
barely hid shoulder-holster bulges (or maybe just securi-
tized Blackberries). As I went through the slowly snak-
ing line for potential terrorists, illegal immigrants, and 
bearers of biological contaminants while he was whisked 
through the super-fast lane reserved for diplomats and 
what looked to be rugby players, I bid what I thought was 
a fi nal farewell to the Ambassador. But I was surprised to 
fi nd him waiting with the rest of us at the luggage car-
ousel (I found Australia to be fl atter than most countries 
in its regard of power). He introduced me to his security 
handler by informing him that this was the Julian As-
sange fan. He then leaned in conspiratorially and said not 
to worry: I had cleared the Interpol check he had ordered 
upon landing. A joke, of course. 
Th e revolution will be decrypted
Th e last word comes not from high diplomacy or low 
punditry. Before history can render a verdict on WikiLe-
aks, technology, fi ttingly, might. In the interzone of 
physics, mathematics, and cryptography comes word of 
a breakthrough, not yet imminent but fully plausible, 
that quantum computing in the next 30, perhaps even 
20 years, will render all encrypted secrets transparent. 
Th e revolution will not just be televised. It will be goog-
led, facebooked, adbusted, tweeted, and instagrammed. 
Th ere will be no secrets to be leaked, no dikes to plug, 
and the penultimate entry on WikiLeaks most likely will 
be cross-referenced to a single WikiQuote:
There is no document of civilization which is not at 
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Notes
1. Th e Wiki-spectre haunts this article. Aside from knowledge already 
housed in my organic database, the article relies mainly on web 
sources, many of them primary texts, interviews, and speeches that 
would be diffi  cult for others to fi nd, read, and fact-check. 
 Wikis although relatively new have already become an indispensa-
ble part of the mediascape. Th e term itself has roots in the Hawaiian 
word for ‘quick’; the concept goes back at least to Vannevar Bush’s 
notion of a ‘memex’, a knowledge system with automatic links that 
he fi rst proposed in a 1945 Atlantic Monthly article. Th e fi rst wiki, 
in the sense of a collaborative computer database, was created by 
Ward Cunningham, who in 1994 produced the website and soft-
ware, the ‘WikiWikiWeb’, that made it possible for multiple parties 
to create, edit and archive web-pages through a browser. Building 
on this technology, Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger created in Janu-
ary 2001 the fi rst wiki encyclopedia, or Wikipedia. As of January 
2012, it contains over 20 million articles in 283 languages. 
 Th ese fi gures come, of course, from Wikipedia, raising the issue of 
reliability, verifi ability, and bias. With an editorial process based 
on consensus rather than credentials, it falls upon contributors to 
maintain editorial standards. Th ere have been attempts to assess 
its accuracy, including a famous 2005 investigation in Nature that 
concluded its scientifi c articles to be no worse in accuracy than the 
Encyclopædia Britannica.(nor better, since ‘serious errors’ were 
found in both).
 A defi nitive study on accuracy and impact awaits (one that counts 
not just citations but surveys actual readers). One must obviously 
be vigilant and skeptical about what is found on the Internet – or, 
for that matter, in the press, on cable news, or even in the academic 
journal. But before refl exively rejecting the knowledge capital of 
Wikipedia or the value of other web-based informational outlets 
like blogs, consider this: the average refereed social science journal 
has 5-10 reviewers, including the editors; the average number of 
readers, depending on the discipline and who’s counting, is between 
17 and 900. Wikipedia has over 100,000 contributors/editors and 
365 million readers. It – they, we – must be doing something right.
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2. It might seem contradictory if not hubristic to claim to be ‘editor-in-
chief ’ of a format that prizes itself for its fl atness: however, in spite of 
the ‘wiki’ preface and its web-base, WikiLeaks stopped being user-
editable and became a limited-access, i.e., conventional, publishing 
site in May 2010. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiLeaks
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradley_Manning
4. None holds a candle to ’Robert Foster’s Rap News 6: WikiLeaks' 
Cablegate: the truth is out there’, http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=hl4NlA97GeQ&feature=relmfu
5. It bears noting that McCain’s demand that Assange be charged 
came shortly before he called for the release of Jonathan Pollard, 
the American spy sentenced to life imprisonment for passing top-
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12. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteen_Points. Th ere is credible 
evidence that President Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’, including an end 
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and a United States of Europe, were infl uenced by Trotsky’s ‘War 
and the International’, a pamphlet he wrote in 1914. Wilson read 
the proofs for an English version in early 1918 – shortly before his 
administration banned postal rights for the International Socialist 
Review, which was about to publish the Preface to ‘War and the 
International’. See http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1914/
war/index.htm.
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